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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

-vs -

Case No.

21809

PATRICK DELANER JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Pa trick Delaner Johnson, appeals
from a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon rendered in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant, Patrick Delaner Johnson, was found
guilty by a jury of the crime of assault with a deadly
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weapon on January 15, 1970, and was thereafter sentenced to be committed to the Utah State Prison on
February 10, 1970, for the term pre,scrihed by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the assault with a
deadly weapon conviction and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 25, 1969, at approximately 2 :30 a.m. m a
parking lot at about 125 East Second South, Richard
Calder was stabbed by appellant Johnson. (T-86-93)
Beyond these facts, there is little agreement, as appellant claimed self-defense and the complaining witness,
Mr. Calder, claiming otherwise.
Mr. Calder testified that he and some friends left
a nearby lounge and encountered appellant in a parking
lot. (T-88-89) Mr. Calder noticed a disagreement between one of his friends and appellant, he stepped
between the two men, and appellant stabbed him. (T-93)
Appellant testified that earlier that night Mr. Calder
and his friends had made insulting remarks on several
occasions to him. (T-55-56) As he left another lounge,
in which Mr. Calder denies having been, (Cf :T-18-19)
he encountered Mr. Calder and his party in the parking
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lot, he was pushed, and someone attempted to stab him,
at which point appellant took his assailant's knife and
stabbed him with it. (T-130)
During the course of the testimony, Officer Ralph
Whitaker tes6fied for the State that he had a conversation with appellant on September 3, 1969. Because of
its importance to this appeal, the relevant testimony
will be quoted in full (T-48-49) :

Q.

Did you make any statement to him?

A.

Yes; in connection with the circumstances
that I was talking to him about on that occasion, I gave him the Miranda warning.

Q.

How did you give him the Miranda warning;
in what manner?

A.

I read it to him from card I carry with me
for this specific purpose. Thi's was the card.

Q.

Now, after having read him the Miranda
warning, did you ask him the questions which
appear on the other side of your card?

A.

Yes I did.

Q.

\Vhat were the questions and what were the
answers, if you can remember?
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A.

Questions were, "Do you understand each 0£
these rights which I have explained to you 7
And, having these rights in mind do you
wish to talk to us

Q.

What were the

A.

He stated he understood them; he didn't state ;
whether he would or would not, specifically,
talk witl1 us; however, he did talk with us.

Q.

What did he say in relation to the offense
which is the subject matter of this

A.

He stated that he could not understand the
circumstances that had led up to our contactin him on this date, but he said he could
understand the other charge. He said he had
stabbed a man in a parking lot at the1 J ocor
Lounge, sometime previously. He could understand that charge, he said, but not the
latest MR. VANSCIVER: W eU, your Honor

A. -

incident.

MR. VANSCIVER: I think this is rather
prejudicil to be talking about something else
that is not even before the Court, today.
MR. HAYCOCK: I think we have been
very careful with fuis; I was very careful
with the question.
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THE COURT: vVhat I want to know is,
whether or not the defendant 'sa1d it; he recites the substance of what the defendant
said to him.
MR. HAYCOCK: If you ·will - again,
talking only about the incdent which is the
snbject mtter of this action; having said that
he stabbed a person, was the other conversation relative to that stabbing1
A.

Only that which I have indicated.
MR. HAYCOCK: Thank you, that is all.
ARGUMENT

PREJUDICIAL ERROR \VAS COMMITTED
WHEN EVIDENCE

·wAS

ADMITTED OF

ANOTHER CRIME UNRELATED TO THE
CHARGE AT TRIAL.
The law is clear that "evidence of other crimes is
not admissable if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity
to commit crime and thus likely to have committed the
crime charged." Stae v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d
811 (1970); State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d
772, at 775 (1969); State v. Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 279
P.2d 914 (1955); State v. N emier, 106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d
327 (1944); Wharton's Criminal Evidence, §232 (Anderson Ed., 1955) ; Wigmore on Evidence, §192 (Third Ed.,
1940). Appellant contends that the testimony of Officer
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Whitaker introduced evidence of another crime, wholly
unrelated to the charge at trial, and that this constituted
prejudicial error.
Officer vVhitaker testified ( T-48), as mentioned in
the statement of facts, that he had a conversation with
the appellant some four months after the incident which
led to the charge at trial, and that at the time he gave
appellant the "Miranda warning" and asked him if he
understood those rights and if he wanted to talk with
them (Officers Whitaker and Anderson).

Appe11ant

talked with Officer Whitaker and said he "understood
the charge" a trial, and that he had stabbed a man in
a parking lot at the J ocor Lounge, but did not understand "the circumstances that led up to our contacting
him on this date." From this testimony it ·was clear to
the jury that appellant was involved in another crime.
The jurors could have easily asked themselves "\Vhen
else is the 'Miranda warning' given except when one is
arrested for a crime and being questioned? \Vhy els<:'
would the police ask appellant if he wanted to talk to
the officers if he was not involved with another
This is especially true in light of the fact that earlier
in the trial, the same day, the jury had heard Officer
Carl Voyles read the "Miranda warning" and describe
how he had read it to appellant when he ·was anested
on the charge at trial. (T-14) The nature of the con-
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verstaion between Officer \Vhitaker and appellant on
September 3, 1969, would thus be clear to the jury, that
is, that appellant was snspect and being questioned
about another crime.
This Court has said in State v. Lnpe.z, supra, 451 P.2d
at 775: "Such arm as there may be in receiving evidence
concerning another crime is to be weighed against the
necessity of full inquiry into the facts relating to the
issues." It is clear that the State did not need to disclose
the nature of the contact between appellant and Officer
-Whitaker. If the State's purpose was simply to establish
that appellant "understood the charge" at trial, and
that he was in fact the man who did the stabbing (something to which appellant himself testified), this could
ha,·e been done without disclosing that appellant was
contacted on another criminal matter and --was suspect.
In Lope.z, supra, evidence of another crime was admitted
because it ·went to a full inquiry of the facts, and dealt
with the propriety of the arrest which was at issue in
that case. In appellant's case, there was simply no necessity to full inquiry into the facts relating to the issues"
bc\cause the State was trying to show, ostensibly, what
appellant said, that is, that he understood the charge at
trial and that he \vas the person who stabbed a man at
the J ocor Lounge, and it Yrns not necessary to go beyond
laying a foundation for the conYersation.
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By introducing this testimony the State made appellant look like a man of evil character with a propensity
for crime, something which was attempted on other occasions during the trial. During cross examination, appellant was asked "Truth is, you get mean when you drink,
don't you" (T-69), and he answered, "No." After stating
that he only fights if he gets "jumped on," appellant
was asked if he was "jumped on" in June of 1968, and if
he fought at that time, and if he was jumped on in November of 1966, to all of which appellant answered tliat
he could not remember. (T-69) These questions clearly
indicated to the jury that appelant was a pugnacious
sort who is often in fights, and this could have raised
an inference in the juror's minds that he likely started
this fight, too. Again, later in cross examination, appellant was asked ( T-75) :

Q. Do you belong to any organization?
A.

No, ·sir.

Q.

You belong to any black militant organization?

A.

No, sir.

At this, objection was sustained that the question had
already been answered "no" and the cross examination
ceased. These two incidens, along with Officer Whitaker's testimony, revel a design on the part of the State
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to make appellant appear as a man of evil character
with a propensity toward crime. However, even disregarding these incidents, appellant contends that prejudice
resulted from Officer Whitaker's testimony.
This Conrt has held evidence of another crime to
be prejudicial error on several occasions. In State v.
Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), the District
Attorney on cross examination of the defendant was
alowed to question him about an incident which occurred
subsequent to the occasion which led to the charge at
trial. The only fact adduced by that questioning was
that the defendant had been charged with being an
accessory to a robbery in Texas, and this was held to
have no probative value as to the defendant's role in
the crime charged. This Court said, 361 P.2d at 414:
Its only effect was to cast aspersions upon
the defendant and to imply that because he was
involved in the Texas trouble he is a person of
evil characer who would be likely to commit such
a crime as the robbery as charged.
The court said further, at 415 :
Inasmuch as we cannot say with any degree
of assurance that there would not have been a
different result in the absence of the error in
cross examining the defendant about the incident in Texas it must be regarded as prejudicial
and the case remanded for a new trial.
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Another case which has an almost identical fact
situation as appellant's is State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266,
382 P.2d 407 (1963). In that case an F.B.I. Agent testified for the State that he had a conversation with the
defendant, and the trial court permitted testimony as
to questions of the Agent asked of the defendant relating
to various crimes, which the defendant denied during
the conversation, but the defendant did admit to the
Agent that he had been arrested on another charge, and
the Agent was allowed to so testify. In that case, the
trial court admonished the jury that the offenses mentioned should be disregarded as they did not connect the
defendant to the present crime. Dickson, supra, was
cited for the proposition that "we cannot say with any
degree of assurance that there would not have been a
different result in the absence of such testimony.'' Thus,
the conviction was reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
Appellant contends that Officer Whitaker's testimony
was evidence of another crime, which as this Court stated
in State v. Wellard, supra, 279 P.2d at 917, is evidence
that "is apt to be given undue weight," and so there can
be no degree of assurance that a different result at trial
would not have occurred had the testimony been excluded. The effect of the testimony wa.s clearly to give
the jury the impreS'sion that appellant was a man of
evil character with a propensity for crime, and in a
fact situation such as existed in appellant's case, where
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the question of self defense depended on whether the
jury believed appellant or the complaining witness, such
testimony was particularly damaging and prejudicial.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, appellant respectfully
submits that the case should be reversed and remanded
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Jay V. Barney
Attorney for Appellant

